• The proliferation of empowered networks makes "ethnographic intelligence" (EI) more important to the United States than ever before.2 Among networks, al-Qaeda is of course the most infamous, but there are several other examples from the recent past and present, such as blood-diamond and drug cartels, that lead to the conclusion that such networks will be a challenge in the foreseeable future. Given the access these networks have to expanded modern communications and transportation and, potentially, to weapons of mass destruction, they are likely to be more formidable than any adversaries we have ever faced.
  • "[I]t is time to start looking more broadly at how our experiences in modern warfare should help shape our national security institutions in the years to come. This essay highlights the most significant lessons I have learned in the post-9/11 world and how I think they could be applied to better prepare us for the full range of challenges we will likely encounter in the future.

    This article began as an effort to identify challenges the U.S. Army must prepare to face, but I soon realized that many of those challenges are connected to the other armed forces, the interagency, and the broader U.S. Government. Therefore, I address elements of our national power beyond just the military. The complexities of today's national security environment demand that we reevaluate missions across the U.S. Government, embrace the requirements for full-spectrum operations, and preserve our most important military principles while adjusting our organizations and values development."

  • "[A]n analytical study of wars of ideas, to the extent they are wars, would enhance our understanding of such conflicts and how we might approach them. With that in mind, this monograph, which is necessarily limited in scope, does two things. First, it offers a brief examination of what appear to be the four basic types of wars of ideas found in history. Second, it uses that examination as a start point for analyzing the principal approaches in the current war of ideas. Just as we would do well to understand the nature of any armed conflict we intend to fight before embarking upon it, so, too, we ought to appreciate the nature of any war of ideas we might attempt to wage."

  • Applies Karl Weick's concept of "sensemaking", and his classic analysis of the Mann Gulch firejumpers disaster, to the problem of unit cohesion. "Understanding and fostering unit cohesion remain vitally important in today's operating environments, and Army doctrine should reflect that importance. The Army should update its views on unit cohesion, not cast them aside as useless or antiquated. It should incorporate new views, such as Weick's thoughts on sensemaking and structure, to flesh out the topic and restore the Army's traditional emphasis on such a critical subject."

  • Historically, the Army and other armed forces worldwide have been about the profession of applying extreme pressure or violence to achieve an end, but the warfighter's paradigm has changed because of the effects of mass media and global interconnectivity. Since the Vietnam War, U.S. military operations have largely occurred in full view of the public. As a result, the Army must change if it wishes to maintain strategic legitimacy in faraway lands…. In addition, there can be no tolerance for the cultural ignorance of media-amplified "strategic corporals" (junior officers and soldiers at the forward edge of the battle area) whose words and actions can affect strategic outcomes. The information genie is out of the bottle, and from now and into the future, Army strategic legitimacy will be closely examined…. If there was ever a period in the Army's history to consider the use of foreign area officers (FAOs) at the tactical level, this is it.